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Abstract
In this paper we study the relationship between unions and growth
in a two-sector overlapping generations model with altruism and hu-
man capital. This relationship depends on the interaction between
the technology in the sector that produces human capital, the degree
of unionization of the economy and the operativeness of the bequest
motive.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between growth
and the role of unions in a two-sector overlapping generations (OLG here-
inafter) model with altruistic agents where endogenous growth is driven by
the accumulation of human capital.
There are two branches of the literature to which our paper relates.
The …rst one combines altruism and endogenous growth based on human
capital accumulation as, for example, Glomm and Ravikumar (1992). These
authors present an OLG model where each parent has a bequest motive and
values the quality of education passed on to the o¤spring. Eckstein and
Zilcha (1994) develop a model where the human capital of the children is
determined by the percentage of the leisure time that parents devote to their
o¤spring. In a recent contribution, Zhang (1996) emphasizes the importance
of the units of goods invested by the parent, the units of the parent’s time
spent, and the human capital of the parent on the human capital of the
child.
The second branch of the literature addresses speci…cally the problem of
unemployment in the context of growth models in unionized economies, but
without taking altruism into account.1’2Bean and Pissarides (1993) develop
a search model where matching frictions create unemployment. They …nd
out that the relationship between growth and the relative bargaining power
of workers’ is ambiguous, being the reason that the shift in income from
entrepreneurs to workers could be compensated by an increase in savings,
and therefore in the growth rate. The same result is achieved by de la Croix
and Licandro (1995) in a model with irreversible decisions; they conclude
that a raise in union power produces crowding-out of physical capital, but
at the same time it raises the …rm’s value, and the physical capital as well.
This paper departs from these two approaches in the following sense.
We develope a two-sector OLG model with intergenerational altruism and
unions, where endogeneous growth is generated by human capital accumu-
lation in the educational sector. The presence of altruism, in the sense that
parents of a given generation will get utility from the utility of their o¤spring
as the dynastic utility in Barro (1974), allows us to generate di¤erent results
depending on the operativeness of the bequest motive3.
This framework allows two possible situations: in the …rst one, the pro-
duction of human capital is given by a linear technology on human capital
1Aghion and Howitt (1994) study the interaction between unemployment and growth
in a one sector model, whereas van Schaik and de Groot (1995) analyse the same question
in a two sector model. None of them includes unions.
2Other models, that emphasize the e¤ect of unionisation on innovation and growth,
are Ulph and Ulph (1994) and Acemoglu (1997).
3As an example, Caballé (1998) shows how economic growth rates change depending
on the operativeness of the bequest motive, which in turn depends on the tax structure.
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as in Uzawa (1965) or Lucas (1988) and thus, there is no physical capital
in the educational sector. For this reason, we can analyse two economies:
in the …rst one, the walrasian case, we face a competitive economy without
unions, whereas in the second one there are unions in the sector that pro-
duces consumption goods. We …nd that the rate of growth is higher in the
unionized economy than in the walrasian one, and this holds no matter the
operativeness of the bequest motive. Higher wages in the unionized sector
have two e¤ects: to increase the demand for physical capital and to decrease
the quantity of labour hired in this sector. Unemployed labour in the con-
sumption goods sector causes wages to decrease in the educational sector
and thus higher returns from human capital investment. The amount of
labour hired increases implying a higher production of human capital and,
hence, a higher rate of growth. It is also worth to emphasize that the level of
altruism that makes the physical bequest motive to be or not operative is the
same in both the walrasian and the unionized economies. This means that
the degree of unionization of the economy does not a¤ect the individual’s
decision about leaving physical bequests.
In contrast with the …rst situation, in the second one physical capital
enters the production function for human capital accumulation as an input.
This allows four possible cases: in the …rst one, the walrasian case, we face
a competitive economy without unions, very much in contrast with the last
one, where we …nd unions in each sector; there are two other similar, in-
termediate cases, with unions in one sector and none in the other (partially
unionized economies). We show that, with strictly positive bequests, the
rate of growth is higher in the walrasian case than in the completely union-
ized economy. The reason is that higher wages in both sectors in the fully
unionized economy cause the total demand for labour to decrease, creating
unemployment. The resulting fall in production more than o¤sets the in-
crease in wages. However, the same conclusion might be reversed comparing
the walrasian case to the partially unionized economies, that is, a partially
unionized economy may grow faster than a walrasian economy. Higher wages
in the unionized sector cause the demand for labour to decrease, but there is
no unemployment because lower wages in the non-unionized sector increase
the demand for labour. The overall e¤ect on the rate of growth is then am-
biguous. In turn, when bequests are inoperative, we get a di¤erent result,
in the sense that even fully unionized economies can grow at higher rates
than competitive ones. When bequests are inoperative, parents devote more
resources to their childrens’ education, and since there are higher wages in
both sectors in the fully unionized economy, these two e¤ects might o¤set
the fall in production due to the unemployment caused by the existence of
unions, compared to the walrasian economy with full employment but lower
wages. In this context, the level of altruism that makes the physical bequest
motive to be or not operative is di¤erent for the walrasian and the fully
unionized economies. Thus, given a certain level of altruism, the union-
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ization degree a¤ects the rate of growth of the economy via two channels:
the direct e¤ect on human capital investment and the indirect e¤ect on the
operativeness of the bequest motive.
In the next section we present the basic model. Linear technology in
the educational sector is discussed in section 3, whereas section 4 studies
the introduction of physical capital in this sector. Section 5 concludes. All
proofs and computations can be found in the Appendix.
2 The basic model
We construct a two-sector OLG model with constant population, whose
mass is normalized to one, and where agents live for three periods. In the
…rst period individuals obtain education bequest from their parents, which
endows them with a human capital level ht. They are endowed with one
unit of labour time that will be supplied inelastically in the second period,
where they also receive a physical bequest bt from their parents and have a
child. Then they decide about consumption Ct in that period, the provision
of education or human capital of their o¤spring ht+1, and savings st. In the
third period they distribute the return from savings between consumption
Ct+1 and bequests to their o¤spring bt+1. The utility of an individual born
at t ¡ 1 is
Vt¡1 = lnCt¡1t + ¯ lnC
t¡1
t+1 + ½Vt; (1)
where the superscript denotes the generation to which individuals belong,
Vt is the utility of their o¤spring, and ¯ > 0. The parameter ½ > 0 is the
altruism factor.
The unit of labor time inelastically supplied by an individual at time t
becomes ht e¢ciency units of labor. Thus, the agent’s labour income in the
second period is wat ht, where w
a
t is the average wage. Since there are two
sectors in the economy and the wage paid in each sector may be di¤erent,
individuals take the wage as the sum of the time they work in each sector
times the wage earned in that sector. Note that wat is the average wage
across …rms, but each and every worker receives precisely wat . Education
is provided through schools or speci…c educational price-taker …rms. We
normalize the price of consumption goods to one. Thus, consumer’s budget
constraints are:
Ct + ptht+1 + st = w
a
t ht + bt; (2)
st (1 + rt+1) = Ct+1 + bt+1; (3)
where ptht+1 is the total expenditure on the education of the o¤spring, pt is
the price in goods of each unit of human capital acquired by the o¤spring
in the school at period t, and rt+1 is the interest rate at t + 1. Maximizing
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(1) subject to (2), (3) and bt+1 ¸ 0 is equivalent to solving the following
problem:
V ¤t¡1 (ht; bt) = maxfst;ht+1;bt+1g
fln (wat ht + bt ¡ st ¡ ptht+1)
+¯ ln [st (1 + rt+1) ¡ bt+1] + ½V ¤t (ht+1; bt+1)g ; bt+1 ¸ 0: (4)
In order to ensure that V ¤t¡1 is bounded above and the solution we will …nd
is the optimal one, we asssume ½ < 1.
There is a consumption goods sector in which each …rm produces ac-
cording to the production function Yt = F (Kt; Lt) = K
°1
t L
1¡°1
t where
°1 2 (0; 1), Kt is the capital employed by the …rm and Lt = htNt is the
e¢cient labor which in turn equals the human capital of workers’ ht times
the time they are hired by the …rm Nt. Since …rms are able to observe
the level of skill of each worker and are price-takers, from the maximization
problem of the …rm we have that factors are paid their marginal products:
1 + rt = °1K
°1¡1
t (htNt)
1¡°1 ; (5)
wt = (1 ¡ °1) K°1t (htNt)¡°1 ; (6)
where wt is the wage paid for one e¢ciency unit of labor by the …rm. From
the above equalities we get
wt
1 + rt
=
1 ¡ °1
°1
µ
Kt
htNt
¶
; (7)
and the optimal capital-labour ratio
kdt =
µ
wt
1 ¡ °1
¶ 1
°1
; (8)
whereas the …rm’s optimal labour demand is, as follows from (8):
htN
d
t = K
d
t
µ
1 ¡ °1
wt
¶ 1
°1
: (9)
This basic framework is shared by the two situations we discuss below.
The …rst one is analysed in section 3 and presents a model where there
is a linear technology in the human capital accumulation function. The
second situation is presented in section 4, where physical capital enters the
production function for human capital accumulation as an input.
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3 Linear technology in the educational sector
We assume the existence of an educational sector, composed by price-taking
…rms. We can interpret it as if individuals contracted the service of one
educational …rm or school in order that their o¤spring receives a certain
human capital level or education. Each educational …rm maximizes pro…ts
ptht+1¡ ¹wthtN t taking into account the way human capital accumulates (or
its “production” function) ht+1 = µ
³
htN t
´
, where N t is the time workers
are hired by the …rm, ¹wt is the wage paid for one e¢ciency unit of labor by
the …rm, and µ is a positive parameter. Since the technology in this sector is
linear, each …rm hires a positive and …nite quantity of labour if the following
condition holds:
¹wt = µpt; (10)
We consider two cases: in the …rst one, without unions, the wage per
e¢cient unit of labour must be equal in both sectors for all …rms. Besides,
all labor supplied is employed and unemployment does not exist. Thus
Nt + N t = 14and wt = ¹wt, which implies:
(1 ¡ °1)K°1t (htNt)¡°1 = µpt: (11)
In the second case, where there are unions in the consumption goods
sector, we assume one union per …rm which invests in physical capital before
the wage bargaining takes place. Thus, the capital stock will be considered
as a constant by unions and …rms when negotiating. In each period the
union sets the wage taking into account that it will a¤ect the quantity of
labor employed only in its …rm. Thus, the union cares about employment
and compares the wage with the income a worker can get if negotiation fails
(vt). The union maximizes (wt ¡ vt)htNt subject to the labor demand given
by (9). The optimal condition is given by
wt =
vt
1 ¡ °1
: (12)
Analogous to Barth and Zweimüller (1995), we assume that in equilib-
rium vt is the expected income that a worker may get over all the economy,
i.e. the average income vt = wat = wtNt + ¹wtN t. Substituting into (12) for
vt yields
¹wtN t = wt (1 ¡ °1 ¡ Nt) : (13)
Since the educational sector is not unionized, the wage in this sector is
that inducing full employment, i.e. Nt + N t = 1.
4Note that both the population mass and the labour time endowment of the individual
are normalized to one.
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The following relationships are valid no matter whether we study the
walrasian or the unionized economy. First, the amount saved by generation
t equals the stock of physical capital at t + 1:
st = Kt+1: (14)
Second,
wat = wtNt + wtN t; (15)
that is, expected wage is equal to the sum of the time they work in each
sector times the wage earned in that sector.5
The problem for consumers is to solve (4). The …rst order conditions
for st and bt+1 are given by equations (16) and (17) respectively, and for
ht+1 are (18W) and (18U) in the walrasian and the unionized economies
respectively (see the Appendix):
1
Ct¡1t
=
¯ (1 + rt+1)
Ct¡1t+1
; (16)
¯
Ct¡1t+1
¸ ½
Ctt+1
with equality if bt+1 > 0; (17)
ptht+1
½Ct¡1t
= (1¡°1)wt+1ht+1
Ctt+1
+ ¯ st+1(1¡°1)(1+rt+2)
Ctt+2
; (18W)
ptht+1
½Ct¡1t
= (1¡°1)
2wt+1ht+1
Ctt+1
+ ¯ st+1(1¡°1)(1+rt+2)
Ctt+2
: (18U)
When bequests are operative, the derivation of the steady-state rates of
growth are as follows. Using (18W) and (18U), (16) and the fact that in
steady-state
Ctt+1
Ct¡1t
= g, we get
gptht+1
½ = (1 ¡ °1) wt+1ht+1 + (1 ¡ °1) st+1; (19W)
gptht+1
½ = (1 ¡ °1)2 wt+1ht+1 + (1 ¡ °1) st+1: (19U)
Introducing (7) and (14) into (19W) and (19U), and using (10):
gwtht+1
µ½ ¡ (1 ¡ °1) wt+1ht+1 = °1
wt+2Nt+2ht+2
1 + rt+2
; (20W)
gwtht+1
µ½ ¡ (1 ¡ °1)2wt+1ht+1 = °1
wt+2Nt+2ht+2
1 + rt+2
: (20U)
5Since there are constant returns to scale, we identify the labor demanded by one …rm
as the total amount of labor demanded by all …rms in the sector.
7
In the walrasian equilibrium we have wt = wt and Nt = 1¡N t. Besides,
if we evaluate in steady state, use from the human capital technology g
W
µ =
N
W and divide by ht+1, we can rearrange (20W) as
gW
1 + r
=
N
W
½ ¡ (1 ¡ °1)
°1
³
1 ¡ NW
´ : (21)
From (16) and (17) we can obtain
gW
1 + r
= ½: (22)
Equations (21), (22) and the production function for human capital accu-
mulation allow us to get
gW = µN
W
=
µ½ [(1 ¡ °1) + ½°1]
1 + ½2°1
: (23)
The process of derivation of the steady-state rate of growth in the union-
ized economy (gU) is similar to the one described above. The only di¤erence
is that wt
³
N t ¡ °1
´
= wtN t so that (23) becomes:
gU = µN
U
=
µ
h
½ (1 ¡ °1)2 + °1 (1 + ½)2
i
1 + ½2°1
: (24)
In the case of inoperative bequests, bt+1 = 0 and (17) holds with strict
inequality. Combining (2), (3) and (16), we get
Ct =
wat ht ¡ ptht+1
1 + ¯
: (25)
Substituting (25) into (2) for Ct gives
st =
(wat ht ¡ ptht+1)¯
1 + ¯
: (26)
Substituting (7), (14) and (15) into (26), and using (10) and the rule of
human capital accumulation yields
°1
1 ¡ °1
gWC
1 + rt+1
=
¯
1 + ¯
: (27)
Combining (27), (21) and the production function for human capital accu-
mulation, we obtain
gWC = µN
W
C =
µ½ (1 ¡ °1) (1 + 2¯)
(1 + ¯) + ¯½ (1 ¡ °1)
: (28)
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The process of derivation for the case of the unionized economy is similar to
the one described above. The only di¤erence is that wt
³
N t ¡ °1
´
= wtN t
so that (28) becomes
gUC = µN
U
C =
µ [½ (1 ¡ °1) (¯ + (1 ¡ °1) (1 + ¯)) + (1 + ¯)°1]
(1 + ¯) + ¯½ (1 ¡ °1)
: (29)
We aim now at …nding the conditions under which parents leave positive
physical bequests to their o¤springs in both the walrasian and the unionized
cases.
De…ne ½W and ½U as the levels of altruism such that the non-negativity
constraint is just binding in equilibrium, i.e. b = 0 and (17) holds with
equality in the walrasian and the unionized economies respectively. Then
from equations (22) and (27), and noting that both of them are valid in the
unionized and the walrasian cases, we have
½W = ½U =
µ
1 ¡ °1
°1
¶ µ
¯
1 + ¯
¶
= ½: (30)
The fact that the critical level of altruism is the same in both the wal-
rasian and the unionized economies means that the degree of unionization of
the economy does not a¤ect the individual’s decision about leaving physical
bequests.
In principle, we should expect that agents are more likely to leave be-
quests when ½ is high, and viceversa, and this is in fact stated in the next
propositions.
Proposition 1 If ½ · ½ then b = 0 in the balanced growth path of both the
walrasian and the unionized economies.
Proposition 2 If ½ > ½ then b > 0 in the balanced growth path of both the
walrasian and the unionized economies.
What the above propositions tell us is that when individuals care little
about their children, they leave them zero physical bequests. In turn, when
individuals’ concern about their children is high, bequests will be positive.
The comparison between the rates of growth in both cases is summarized
in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (a) When bequests are operative (i.e. ½ > ½), then
gU > gW .
(b) When bequests are inoperative (i.e. ½ · ½), then gUC > gWC .
Proof. Direct comparison between (23) and (24) and between (28) and
(29).
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Higher wages in the unionized sector has two e¤ects: to increase the
demand for physical capital and to decrease the quantity of labour hired
in this sector. Unemployed labour in the consumption goods sector causes
wages to decrease in the educational sector and thus higher returns from
human capital investment. The amount of labour hired increases, implying
a higher production of human capital and, hence, a higher rate of growth.
4 Physical capital in the educational sector
In this section we introduce a di¤erent rule of human capital accumulation
in the educational sector. Each educational …rm maximizes pro…ts ptht+1¡
¹wthtN t¡(1 + rt) ¹Kt taking into account the way human capital accumulates
ht+1 = µ ¹K
°2
t
³
htN t
´1¡°2
, where ¹Kt is the capital employed by the …rm, N t
is the time workers are hired by the …rm, °2 2 (0; 1), ¹wt is the wage paid for
one e¢ciency unit of labor by the …rm, and µ is a positive parameter. The
optimality conditions are:
1 + rt = °2µpt ¹K
°2¡1
t
³
htN t
´1¡°2
; (31)
¹wt = (1 ¡ °2) µpt ¹K°2t
³
htN t
´¡°2
; (32)
from where
wt
1 + rt
=
1 ¡ °2
°2
Ã
Kt
htN t
!
: (33)
The optimal capital-labour ratio is
k
d
t =
·
wt
µpt (1 ¡ °2)
¸ 1
°2
; (34)
whereas the …rm’s optimal labour demand is, as follows from (34):
htN
d
t = K
d
t
·
µpt (1 ¡ °2)
wt
¸ 1
°2
: (35)
The following relationships are valid no matter which of the four types of
equilibria we study. First, we have expected wage as de…ned in (15). Second,
the amount saved by generation t equals the stock of physical capital at t+1:
st = Kt+1 + Kt+1: (36)
Finally, by arbitrage the interest rate must be equal in both sectors. There-
fore, from (5) and (31),
°1K
°1¡1
t (htNt)
1¡°1 = °2µpt ¹K
°2¡1
t
³
htN t
´1¡°2
: (37)
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From the consumer’s maximization problem (4), we obtain the …rst or-
der conditions (16) and (17) for st and bt+1 respectively, and the following
equation for ht+1 (see the Appendix).
ptht+1
½Ct¡1t
= (1¡°1)wt+1Nt+1ht+1+(1¡°2)wt+1Nt+1ht+1
Ctt+1
+ ¯ st+1(1¡°2)
2(1+rt+2)
Ctt+2
: (38)
We analyse four possible situations: walrasian equilibrium (no unions),
one union in one of the sectors and none in the other, and …nally, a fully
unionized economy (unions in both sectors). We assume that …rms invest in
capital before the wage bargaining takes place. Thus, the capital stock will
be considered as a constant by unions and …rms when negotiating.
Let us analyse now the derivation of the steady-state rates of growth
when bequests are operative in each of the four cases. In the walrasian
case, without unions, the wage per e¢cient unit of labour must be equal
in both sectors for all …rms. Besides, all labor supplied is employed and
unemployment does not exist. Thus Nt + N t = 1 and wt = ¹wt:
(1 ¡ °1)K°1t (htNt)¡°1 = (1 ¡ °2) µpt ¹K°2t
³
htN t
´¡°2
: (39)
Combining this equality and (37) we obtain that
Kt =
1 ¡ °2
°2
°1
1 ¡ °1
Nt
N t
¹Kt; (40)
which combined with (39) givesÃ
¹Kt
htN t
!°1¡°2
=
µ
°2
°1
¶°1 µ1 ¡ °2
1 ¡ °1
¶1¡°1
µpt: (41)
From (41) and after some manipulations (see the Appendix) we get the
expression for the steady-state rate of growth of this economy GW = ht+1ht =
GW (µ; ½; °1; °2).
In the second case, with unions in the consumption goods sector, the
bargaining process is the same than in the previous section. Thus, (12) and
(13) are still valid. Besides, since the educational sector is not unionized,
the wage in this sector is that inducing full employment, i.e. Nt + N t = 1.
Plugging (6) and (32) into (13) for wt and wt respectively:
(1 ¡ °1)K°1t (htNt)¡°1 = (1 ¡ °2) µpt ¹K°2t
³
htN t
´¡°2 N t
N t ¡ °1
; (42)
which combined with (37) gives
Kt =
°1
°2
(1 ¡ °2)
(1 ¡ °1)
N t
N t ¡ °1
¹Kt: (43)
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Combining the last equality and (42) results in
Ã
¹Kt
htN t
!°1¡°2
=
µ
°2
°1
¶°1 µ1 ¡ °2
1 ¡ °1
¶(1¡°1)
µpt
Ã
N t
N t ¡ °1
!1¡°1
: (44)
The derivation of the steady-state rate of growth GG = GG (µ; ½; °1; °2) from
the last equation is straightforward (see the Appendix).
Proposition 4 Given (½; °1; °2) 2 - = (0; 1)£(0; 1)£(0; 1), there exist two
disjoint open subsets with positive measure, -1 and -2, such that -1 [-2 =
-. If (½; °1; °2) 2 -1 then GW > GG and if (½; °1; °2) 2 -2 then GW · GG.
Higher wages in the consumption goods sector have two e¤ects: to in-
crease the demand for physical capital and to decrease the quantity of labour
hired in this sector. Unemployed labour in the consumption goods sector
causes wages to decrease in the educational sector, and thus the amount of
labour hired increases and the demand for physical capital decreases. The
overall e¤ect on the returns from human capital investment depends on the
elasticities of productive inputs.
In the third case, with unions in the educational sector, the union maxi-
mizes ( ¹wt ¡ vt)htN t subject to the labor demand of the …rm, given by (35),
and the outcome is
¹wt =
vt
1 ¡ °2
: (45)
Using vt = wat , (45) becomes
wtNt = ¹wt
³
1 ¡ °2 ¡ N t
´
: (46)
Since the consumption goods sector is not unionized, there is full employ-
ment, i.e. Nt + N t = 1. From this last equality and substituting (6) and
(32) into (46) for wt and wt respectively:
(1 ¡ °1)K°1t (htNt)¡°1 = (1 ¡ °2) µpt ¹K°2t
³
htN t
´¡°2 1 ¡ °2 ¡ N t
1 ¡ N t
; (47)
which combined with (37) gives
Kt =
°1
°2
(1 ¡ °2)
(1 ¡ °1)
1 ¡ °2 ¡ N t
N t
¹Kt: (48)
Combining(47) and (48), we obtain
Ã
¹Kt
htN t
!°1¡°2
=
µ
°2
°1
¶°1 µ1 ¡ °2
1 ¡ °1
¶(1¡°1)
µpt
Ã
1 ¡ °2 ¡ N t
1 ¡ N t
!1¡°1
; (49)
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from where we get the steady-state rate of growth GE = GE (µ; ½; °1; °2)
(see the Appendix).
Proposition 5 Given (½; °1; °2) 2 ª = (0; 1)£(0; 1)£(0; 1), there exist two
disjoint open subsets with positive measure, ª1 and ª2, such that ª1[ª2 =
ª. If (½; °1; °2) 2 ª1 then GW > GE and if (½; °1; °2) 2 ª2 then GW · GE.
Higher wages in the educational sector have two e¤ects: to increase the
demand for physical capital and to decrease the quantity of labour hired in
this sector. Unemployed labour in the educational sector causes wages to de-
crease in the consumption goods sector, and thus the amount of labour hired
increases and the demand for physical capital decreases. The overall e¤ect
on the returns from human capital investment depends on the elasticities of
productive inputs.
Finally, the fourth case presents a situation where all …rms in both sec-
tors are unionized. The bargaining process is the same than the one de-
scribed above for the partially unionized economies. Thus, we can combine
equations (12) and (45) to get
wt (1 ¡ °1) = ¹wt (1 ¡ °2) ; (50)
and substituting it into (46) we obtain
Nt =
1 ¡ °1
1 ¡ °2
³
1 ¡ °2 ¡ N t
´
: (51)
From (50), (6) and (32) we have
(1 ¡ °1)2K°1t (htNt)¡°1 = (1 ¡ °2)2 µpt ¹K°2t
³
htN t
´¡°2
: (52)
Combining this equality and (37) we obtain
Kt =
°1
°2
(1 ¡ °2)2
(1 ¡ °1)2
Nt
N t
¹Kt: (53)
From the last equality, substituting in (52) for KtNt givesÃ
¹Kt
htN t
!°1¡°2
=
µ
°2
°1
¶°1 µ1 ¡ °2
1 ¡ °1
¶2(1¡°1)
µpt; (54)
from where we get the steady-state rate of growth GU = GU (µ; ½; °1; °2)
(see the Appendix).
Proposition 6 GW > GU .
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The existence of unions in both sectors increases wages, and thus the
demand for labour in both sectors decreases and the demand for capital
increases. However, the fall in production due to the lower amount of labour
employed o¤sets the former e¤ect, which in turn implies that the growth rate
of the fully unionized economy is unambiguously lower.
Let us consider now the situation in which bequests are inoperative, i.e.
bt+1 = 0. Unfortunately, the problem is not easily tractable, and we focus
on the particular parameter con…guration °1 = °2 = °, and the walrasian
and the fully unionized economies6. Though we lose information about
steady-state growth rates, this simplifying assumption still will allow us
to see how the results di¤er. The most important one indicates that the
steady-state rate of growth of the fully unionized economy can be higher
than the walrasian steady-state growth rate. This result is in contrast with
the …ndings in proposition 6 because we obtain that even fully unionized
economies can grow faster than competitive economies.
It is interesting to characterize the case bt+1 = 0 in terms of the altruism
factor ½ given the intuition that relates this parameter and the “willingness”
to leave bequests. Solving for the critical levels of altruism (see the Appen-
dix), we obtain ½¤W = ½¤W (°; ¯) and ½¤U = ½¤U (°; ¯) for the walrasian and
the fully unionized economies, respectively.
Lemma 7 Assume °1 = °2 = °. Then ½¤U > ½¤W .
In principle, we should expect that agents are more likely to leave be-
quests when ½ is high, and viceversa.
Proposition 8 Assume °1 = °2 = °. If ½ · ½¤W then b = 0 in the balanced
growth path of the walrasian economy.
Proposition 9 Assume °1 = °2 = °. If ½ > ½
¤
W then b > 0 in the balanced
growth path of the walrasian economy.
What proposition 8 tells us is that when individuals care little about the
utility of their children, they leave zero physical bequests. Whereas, when
individuals’ concern about their children’s utility is high, bequests will be
positive. The same results apply for the fully unionized economy. When be-
quests are inoperative, the solution to the consumer’s maximization problem
yields (see the Appendix) GWC = G
W
C (µ; °; ½; ¯) and G
U
C = G
U
C (µ; °; ½; ¯),
where the subindex C denotes that is evaluated when bequests are zero.
Proposition 10 When bequests are inoperative (i.e. ½ < ½¤W ) and °1 =
°2 = °, then, given (°; ½; ¯) 2 © = (0; 1) £ (0; 1) £ (0; 1), there exist two
6Even the simplifying assumption °1 = °2 = ° , we skip the analysis in the cases in
which there is a union in one of the sectors and none in the other given the untractability
of the algebra.
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disjoint open subsets with positive measure, ©1 and ©2, such that ©1 [©2 =
©. If (°; ½; ¯) 2 ©1 then GWC > GUC and if (°; ½; ¯) 2 ©2 then GWC · GUC.
The intuition behind this result is that when the economy is fully union-
ized, wages in both sectors increase, which in turn implies lower returns
from human capital investment. At the same time, we have zero bequests,
implying that agents increase the proportion of their income they devote to
their childrens’ education. Hence, the overall e¤ect on the rate of growth is
ambiguous.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we study the relationship between growth and the role of unions
in a two-sector OLG model with altruistic agents where endogeneous growth
is generated by human capital accumulation in the educational sector.
This framework allows two possible situations: in the …rst one, the pro-
duction of human capital is given by a linear technology on human capital
and thus, there is no physical capital in the educational sector. For this rea-
son, we can analyse two economies: in the …rst one, the walrasian case, we
face a competitive economy without unions, whereas in the second one there
are unions in the sector that produces consumption goods. We …nd that the
rate of growth is higher in the unionized economy than in the walrasian
one, and this holds no matter the operativeness of the bequest motive. It is
also worth to emphasize that the level of altruism that makes the physical
bequest motive to be or not operative is the same in both the walrasian
and the unionized economies. This means that the degree of unionization of
the economy does not a¤ect the individual’s decision about leaving physical
bequests.
In contrast with the …rst situation, in the second one physical capital
enters the production function for human capital accumulation as an input.
This allows four possible cases: in the …rst one, the walrasian case, we face
a competitive economy without unions, very much in contrast with the last
one, where we …nd unions in each sector; there are two other similar, in-
termediate cases, with unions in one sector and none in the other (partially
unionized economies). We show that, with strictly positive bequests, the
rate of growth is higher in the walrasian case than in the completely union-
ized economy. However, the same conclusion might be reversed comparing
the walrasian case to the partially unionized economies, that is, a partially
unionized economy may grow faster than a walrasian economy. In turn,
when bequests are inoperative, we get a di¤erent result, in the sense that
even fully unionized economies can grow at higher rates than competitive
ones. In this context, the level of altruism that makes the physical bequest
motive to be operative or not is di¤erent for the walrasian and the fully
15
unionized economies. Thus, given a certain level of altruism, the union-
ization degree a¤ects the rate of growth of the economy via two channels:
the direct e¤ect on human capital investment and the indirect e¤ect on the
operativeness of the bequest motive.
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Appendix
² Consumer’s problem in the case of linear technology in the educational
sector
We explain how to get equations (16), (17), (18W) and (18U). The FOC
for st (16) is straightforward from (4). To obtain the FOC for bt+1, (17), we
di¤erentiate (4) to get
¯
Ct¡1t+1
= ½
µ
@V ¤t (ht+1; bt+1)
@bt+1
¶
: (A.1)
Using the envelope theorem in (4) shifted one period ahead, we have
@V ¤t (ht+1; bt+1)
@bt+1
=
1
Ctt+1
: (A.2)
Equation(A.2) into (A.1) for @V
¤
t (ht+1;bt+1)
@bt+1
yields the FOC (17). To obtain
(18W) and (18U), the FOC for ht+1, we di¤erentiate (4) to obtain
pt
Ct¡1t
= ½
µ
@V ¤t (ht+1; bt+1)
@ht+1
¶
: (A.3)
Using the envelope theorem in (4) shifted one period ahead, we get
@V ¤t (ht+1; bt+1)
@ht+1
=
wat+1 + ht+1
@wat+1
@ht+1
¡ pt+1 @ht+2@ht+1
Ctt+1
+ ¯
st+1
@(1+rt+2)
@ht+2
@ht+2
@ht+1
Ctt+2
+½
@V ¤t+1 (ht+2; bt+2)
@ht+2
@ht+2
@ht+1
: (A.4)
From the human capital accumulation function,
@ht+2
@ht+1
= µN t+1 =
ht+2
ht+1
: (A.5)
In the walrasian case, wt = wt and Nt = 1 ¡ N t. From …rms’ pro…t maxi-
mizing conditions, plugging (6) into (15) and di¤erentiating with respect to
ht+1 yields
@wat+1
@ht+1
= ¡°1 (1 ¡ °1)K°1t+1N¡°1t+1 h¡(1+°1)t+1 =
¡°1wt+1
ht+1
: (A.6W)
In the unionized economy, wt
³
N t ¡ °1
´
= wtN t and Nt = 1 ¡ N t. This,
together with (6) into (15) and di¤erentiating with respect to ht+1 yields
@wat+1
@ht+1
= ¡°1 (1 ¡ °1)2K°1t+1N¡°1t+1 h¡(1+°1)t+1 =
¡°1 (1 ¡ °1)wt+1
ht+1
: (A.6U)
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From (5) we can obtain
@ (1 + rt+2)
@ht+2
= °1 (1 ¡ °1)K°1¡1t+2 (Nt+2ht+2)1¡°1
1
ht+2
= (1 ¡ °1)
1 + rt+2
ht+2
:
(A.7)
Plugging equations (15), (A.5), (A.6W), (A.7) and (A.3) shifted one period
ahead into (A.4) yields
@V ¤t (ht+1; bt+1)
@ht+1
=
(1 ¡ °1)wt+1
Ctt+1
+
¯ (1 ¡ °1) st+1 1+rt+2ht+1
Ctt+2
; (A.8W)
and (A.8W) into (A.3) for @V
¤
t (ht+1;bt+1)
@ht+1
gives the FOC (18W). Plugging
equations (15), (A.5), (A.6U), (A.7) and (A.3) shifted one period ahead into
(A.4) yields
@V ¤t (ht+1; bt+1)
@ht+1
=
(1 ¡ °1)2wt+1
Ctt+1
+
¯ (1 ¡ °1) st+1 1+rt+2ht+1
Ctt+2
; (A.8U)
and (A.8U) into (A.3) for @V
¤
t (ht+1;bt+1)
@ht+1
gives the FOC (18U).
² Proof of Proposition 1
The proof of the next two propositions is done below for the walrasian
case. We skip the proof in the unionized case because of its similarity. Before
proceeding with the proof, we will rewrite (16) and (17) in a more convenient
way. From (16), (2), (3) and (14) we get
Kt+1 = st =
¯
1 + ¯
(wat ht + bt ¡ ptht+1) +
bt+1
¯ (1 + rt+1)
: (A.9)
From (A.9), use wat = wt = wt, equations (5), (6), (10) and the rule of
human capital accumulation, and divide by ht+1Nt+1 to obtain in steady
state
k =
¯ (1 ¡ °1)
1 + ¯
k°1
g
+
¯
1 + ¯
bt
ht+1N
+
bt+1
¯°1ht+1N
k1¡°1 : (A.10)
where k is the capital-e¢cient labour ratio, g = gW and N = NW but we
supress the superindex for an easier treatment. From (16), (17) and (5), we
get in steady state
g ¸ ½°1k°1¡1: (A.11)
To prove the proposition we proceed by contradiction (see Caballé 1995).
Suppose the proposition is false, that is, ½ · ½ and bc > 0. Then the
equilibrium triplet (gc; kc; bc) must satisfy
kc =
¯ (1 ¡ °1)
1 + ¯
k
°1
c
gc
+
¯
1 + ¯
bct
ht+1Nc
+
bct+1
¯°1ht+1Nc
k1¡°1c : (A.12)
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and (A.11) holds with equality.
De…ne k as the unique positive solution when the non-negativity con-
straint is just binding in equilibrium, i.e., bi = 0 for all i and (A.11) holds
with equality. Hence, the associated savings function (A.10) becomes
k =
¯ (1 ¡ °1)
1 + ¯
k
°1
g
: (A.13)
Given that bci > 0 for all i, from (A.12) and (A.13) we have
k
°1¡1
c
gc
<
k
°1¡1
g
:
Since ½ · ½, from (A.11) we get
k
°1¡1
c
gc
¸ k
°1¡1
g
;
which yields a contradiction. Therefore, (gc; kc) cannot characterize a bal-
anced equilibrium path with positive physical bequests.
² Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose the proposition is false, i.e., ½ > ½ and bci = 0 for all i. Then
(A.11) holds with inequality:
1
°1½
¸ k
°1¡1
c
gc
: (A.14)
By the de…nition of ½ we get
1
°1½
=
k
°1¡1
g
: (A.15)
Clearly, since ½ > ½, from (A.14) and (A.15) it follows that
gck
1¡°1
c > gk
1¡°1: (A.16)
Since bci = 0 for all i, from (A.10), we have
kc =
¯ (1 ¡ °1)
1 + ¯
k
°1
c
gc
: (A.17)
From (A.13) and (A.17) we obtain
gck
1¡°1
c = gk
1¡°1;
which contradicts (A.16).
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² Consumer’s problem in the case of physical capital in the educational
sector
From problem (4), the …rst order conditions (FOC’s) for st, bt+1 and ht+1
are given by equations (16), (17) and (38) respectively. The derivation of
(38), the FOC for ht+1, is as follows. From the human capital accumulation
function,
@ht+2
@ht+1
= (1 ¡ °2)
ht+2
ht+1
: (A.18)
From …rms’ pro…t maximizing conditions, plugging (6) and (32) into (15)
and di¤erentiating with respect to ht+1 yields
@wat+1
@ht+1
= ¡°1 (1 ¡ °1)K°1t+1N¡°1t+1 h¡(1+°1)t+1 Nt+1
¡°2 (1 ¡ °2) µpt+1K°2t+1N¡°2t+1 h¡(1+°2)t+2 N t+1
= ¡°1wt+1
Nt+1
ht+1
¡ °2wt+1
N t+1
ht+1
=
1
ht+1
³
¡°1wt+1Nt+1 ¡ °2wt+1N t+1
´
;
(A.19)
and from (31),
@ (1 + rt+2)
@ht+2
= (1 ¡ °2)
1 + rt+2
ht+2
: (A.20)
Equations (A.18),(A.19),(A.20) and (A.3) shifted one period ahead into
(A.4) yields
@V ¤t (ht+1; bt+1)
@ht+1
=
(1 ¡ °1)wt+1Nt+1 + (1 ¡ °2) wt+1N t+1 ¡ (1 ¡ °2) pt+1 ht+2ht+1
Ctt+1
+¯
st+1 (1 ¡ °2)2 1+rt+2ht+1
Ctt+2
+
pt+1
Ctt+1
(1 ¡ °2)
ht+2
ht+1
; (A.21)
and (A.21) into (A.3) for @V
¤
t (ht+1;bt+1)
@ht+1
gives the FOC (38). Now we re-
arrange (38) to get a tractable equation; from (16) and (17) we get
1
Ct¡1t
=
¯ (1 + rt+1)
Ct¡1t+1
=
½ (1 + rt+1)
Ctt+1
: (A.22)
Plugging (16) shifted one period ahead and (A.22) into (38) and after rear-
ranging
pt =
1
1+rt+1
½h
(1 ¡ °1)wt+1Nt+1 + (1 ¡ °2)wt+1N t+1
i
+ (1 ¡ °2)2
st+1
ht+1
¾
:
(A.23)
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Now we try to get rid of st+1 in (A.23). Combining equations (7), (33) and
(36)
wt+1
1 + rt+1
=
1 ¡ °1
°1
Kt+1 (ht+1Nt+1)
¡1 =
1 ¡ °1
°1
³
st ¡ Kt+1
´
(ht+1Nt+1)
¡1
=
1 ¡ °1
°1
µ
st ¡ °2
1 ¡ °2
wt+1
1 + rt+1
ht+1N t+1
¶
(ht+1Nt+1)
¡1 ;
implying
°1
1 ¡ °1
wt+1
1 + rt+1
ht+1Nt+1 +
°2
1 ¡ °2
wt+1
1 + rt+1
ht+1N t+1 = st: (A.24)
Substituting (A.24) into (A.23) for st+1 yields
pt =
1
1 + rt+1
nh
(1 ¡ °1)wt+1Nt+1 + (1 ¡ °2)wt+1N t+1
i
+(1 ¡ °2)2
ht+2
ht+1
1
1 + rt+2
·
°1
1 ¡ °1
wt+2Nt+2 +
°2
1 ¡ °2
wt+2N t+2
¸¾
(A.25)
² Derivation of the steady-state rate of growth GW
In the competitive equilibrium we have wt = wt and Nt = 1 ¡ N t.
Besides, 1 + rt+1 = G
W
½ from (A.22), and we can rearrange (A.25) as
pt =
1 ¡ °2
°2
Kt+1
ht+1N t+1
h
N t+1 (°1 ¡ °2) + (1 ¡ °1)
i
+
½ (1 ¡ °2)2
°2 (1 ¡ °1)
Kt+2
ht+2N t+2
h
N t+2 (°2 ¡ °1) + °1 (1 ¡ °2)
i
: (A.26)
Substituting (A.26) into (41) for pt and using KthtN t
=
³
ht+1
ht
1
µN t
´ 1
°2 from the
human capital accumulation function, we obtain
³
ht+1
htµN t
´°1¡°2
°2 =
³
°2
°1
´°1 ³1¡°2
1¡°1
´1¡°1 1¡°2
°2
µ
(µ
ht+2
ht+1µN t+1
¶ 1
°2
[N t+1 (°1 ¡ °2)
+ (1 ¡ °1)] + ½(1¡°2)(1¡°1)
µ
ht+3
ht+2µN t+2
¶ 1
°2
h
N t+2 (°2 ¡ °1) + °1 (1 ¡ °2)
i)
:
(A.27)
In the balanced growth path, the steady-state growth rate is given by ht+1ht =
GW . Thus, (A.27) becomes
Ã
GW
µN
!°1¡°2¡1
°2
=
µ
°2
°1
¶°1 µ1 ¡ °2
1 ¡ °1
¶1¡°1 1 ¡ °2
°2
µ
nh
N (°1 ¡ °2) + (1 ¡ °1)
i
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+
½ (1 ¡ °2)
(1 ¡ °1)
h
N (°2 ¡ °1) + °1 (1 ¡ °2)
i¾
: (A.28)
Now, in order to …nd NW in steady-state, from (A.23) and (A.24) , we get
1
(1 ¡ °2)2
n
pt¡1ht (1 + rt) ¡ ht
h
(1 ¡ °1)wtNt + (1 ¡ °2)wtN t
io
=
ht+1
1 + rt+1
·
°1
1 ¡ °1
wt+1Nt+1 +
°2
1 ¡ °2
wt+1N t+1
¸
: (A.29)
From the human capital accumulation function and (32), we have that
pt¡1ht = wt¡1ht¡1N t¡11¡°2 ; hence, (A.29) becomes
1
(1 ¡ °2)2
(
wt¡1ht¡1N t¡1
1 ¡ °2
(1 + rt) ¡ ht
h
(1 ¡ °1)wtNt + (1 ¡ °2)wtN t
i)
=
ht+1
1 + rt+1
·
°1
1 ¡ °1
wt+1Nt+1 +
°2
1 ¡ °2
wt+1N t+1
¸
: (A.30)
Introducing wt = wt = w, Nt = 1 ¡ N t = 1 ¡ NW , and 1 + rt = GW½ for all
t, and dividing by ht¡1
N
W
=
½ (1 ¡ °2)
h
(1 ¡ °1)2 + ½°1 (1 ¡ °2)2
i
(1 ¡ °1) + ½ (°1 ¡ °2)2 (1 ¡ °2)
: (A.31)
Equations (A.28) and (A.31) de…ne the rate of growth in this economy
GW = GW (µ; ½; °1; °2).
² Derivation of the steady-state rate of growth GG
From equation (13) we have wtNt = wtNtN t¡°1
³
1 ¡ N t
´
, so that (A.26)
becomes:
pt =
1 ¡ °2
°2
Kt+1
ht+1N t+1
N t+1
N t+1 ¡ °1
h
N t+1 (°1 ¡ °2) + 1 ¡ 2°1 + °1°2
i
+
½ (1 ¡ °2)2
°2 (1 ¡ °1)
Kt+2
ht+2N t+2
N t+2
N t+2 ¡ °1
h
N t+2 (°2 ¡ °1) + °1 (1 ¡ 2°2 + °1°2)
i
(A.32)
Substituting (A.32) into (44) for pt and after some manipulations yields, in
steady-state:³
GG
µN
G
´ °1¡°2¡1
°2 =
³
°2
°1
´°1 ³1¡°2
1¡°1
´1¡°1 1¡°2
°2
µ
nh
N
G
(°1 ¡ °2) + 1 ¡ 2°1 + °1°2
i
+½(1¡°2)(1¡°1)
h
N
G
(°2 ¡ °1) + °1 (1 ¡ 2°2 + °1°2)
ioµ
N
G
N
G¡°1
¶2¡°1
(A.33)
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Reasoning as in the previous case to …nd out NG in steady-state:
N
G
= ½(1¡°2)[(1¡°1)(1¡2°1+°1°2)+½°1(1¡°2)(1¡2°2+°1°2)](1¡°1)+½(°1¡°2)(1¡°2)[½(1¡°2)¡(1¡°1)] (A.34)
Equations (A.33) and (A.34) de…ne the rate of growth in this economy
GG = GG (µ; ½; °1; °2).
² Proof of Proposition 4
Substituting (A.31) into (A.28) and (A.34) into (A.33) for N
W
and N
G
respectively would give us GW and GG as a function of the parameters of
the model, and direct comparison between these two rates of growth yields
that (½; °1; °2) 2 -1 ifµ
½(1¡°2)[(1¡°1)2+½°1(1¡°2)2]
°1(1¡°1)+½(1¡°2)[(1¡°1)(1¡2°1+°1°2)+½°1(1¡°2)(1¡2°2+°1°2)]
¶1¡°2
°2
> (1 ¡ °1).
Equivalently, (½; °1; °2) 2 -2 if the above inequality does not hold.
² Derivation of the steady-state rate of growth GE
The derivation is similar to that of GW , getting:
³
GE
µN
E
´ °1¡°2¡1
°2 =
³
°2
°1
´°1 ³1¡°2
1¡°1
´1¡°1 ³1¡°2
°2
´µ
1¡°2¡NE
1¡NE
¶1¡°1
µ (1 ¡ °2)nh
N
E
(°1 ¡ °2) + (1 ¡ °1)
i
+ ½(1¡°2)(1¡°1)
h
N
E
(°2 ¡ °1) + °1 (1 ¡ °2)
io
;
(A.35)
where
N
E
= (1 ¡ °2)NW : (A.36)
Equations (A.35), (A.36) and (A.31) de…ne the rate of growth of this econ-
omy GE = GE (µ; ½; °1; °2).
² Proof of Proposition 5
Comparing (A.35) to (A.28) using (A.36) and (A.31) to get rid of NE
and N
W
would yield that (½; °1; °2) 2 ª1 ifµ
½(1¡°2)f(°1¡°2)[½(1¡°2)¡(1¡°1)]¡[(1¡°1)2+½°1(1¡°2)2]g
(1¡°1)+½(1¡°2)f(°1¡°2)[½(1¡°2)¡(1¡°1)]¡(1¡°2)[(1¡°1)2+½°1(1¡°2)2]g
¶ °2
1¡°2
> (1 ¡ °2).
Equivalently, (½; °1; °2) 2 ª2 if the above inequality does not hold.
² Derivation of the steady-state rate of growth GU
The derivation follows the reasoning for that of GW , getting:Ã
GU
µN
U
!°1¡°2¡1
°2
=
µ
°2
°1
¶°1 µ1 ¡ °2
1 ¡ °1
¶2(1¡°1) 1 ¡ °2
°2
µ
nh
N
U
(°1 ¡ °2)
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+ (1 ¡ °1) (1 ¡ °2)] +
½ (1 ¡ °2)
(1 ¡ °1)
h
N
U
(°2 ¡ °1) + °1 (1 ¡ °2)
i¾
; (A.37)
where
N
U
= (1 ¡ °2)NW : (A.38)
Equations (A.37), (A.38) and (A.31) de…ne the rate of growth of this econ-
omy GU = GU (µ; ½; °1; °2).
Note that there exists unemployment in this case, given by
U = 1 ¡ NU ¡ NU = °1 + ½(°1¡°2)(1¡°2)
2[(1¡°1)2+½°1(1¡°2)2]
(1¡°1)+½(°1¡°2)2(1¡°2)
: (A.39)
² Proof of Proposition 6
Directly comparing (A.37) and (A.28) using (A.38) and (A.31).
² Derivation of the critical levels of altruism ½¤W and ½¤U and proof of
Lemma 7
Consider the limiting case in which bt+1 = 0 but the …rst order condition
(17) is just binding. Let us restrict our attention to the steady-state of the
walrasian case. Equation (A.22) implies
1 + r¤ =
G¤
½
; (A.40)
where the star denotes that is evaluated when bequests are zero. From (5),
(40) and the human capital accumulation function, we obtain
1 + r¤ = °
Ã
K
hN
!°¡1
= °
µ
G¤
µN
W
¶ °¡1
°
: (A.41)
Combining (A.40) and (A.41) we get
½° =
0B@ G¤h
µN
W
i1¡°
1CA
1
°
: (A.42)
Combining equations (A.41) and, from the derivation of the steady-state
growth rates (A.58), we obtain
0B@ G¤h
µN
W
i1¡°
1CA
1
°
=
1 ¡ ° ¡ NW
1 + 1¯
: (A.43)
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From equations (A.42), (A.43) and, from the derivation of the steady-state
growth rates (A.61), we get, solving for the critical level of altruism7
½¤W =
¡[°(1+¯)+¯(1¡°)2]+
q
[°(1+¯)+¯(1¡°)2]2+4¯2°(1¡°)3
2¯°(1¡°)2 :
A similar reasoning in the case of the fully unionized economy would give
½¤U =
¡[°(1+¯)+¯(1¡°)2]+
q
[°(1+¯)+¯(1¡°)2]2+4¯2°(1¡°)2
2¯°(1¡°)2
² Proof of Proposition 8
Noting that k = k, from equations (2), (3), (16), (32), (36), (40) shifted
one period ahead, the rule for human capital accumulation and dividing by
ht+1Nt+1 we can obtain:
Gk¡°
µ
+
1 + ¯
¯
Gk1¡° = 1 ¡ ° + bt
ht+1
Gk¡° +
1 + ¯
¯2
bt+1
(1 + rt+1)ht+1
Gk¡° :
(A.44)
From (15), (16) and (17) we get:
G ¸ ½°k°¡1; (A.45)
From (5) and (A.59), we can derive:
1
(1 ¡ °)2 ½ =
1 + Gk1¡°
N
: (A.46)
To prove the proposition, we proceed by contradiction. Suppose not,
that is, ½s · ½¤ and bs > 0. From (A.45) we have that
Gsk1¡°s · G¤k1¡°¤ ; (A.47)
where k¤ is the unique positive solution when the non-negativity constraint
is just binding in equilibrium, i.e., bi = 0 for all i and (A.45) holds with
equality. The savings function associated to k¤ (A.44) becomes
G¤k¡°¤
µ
+
1 + ¯
¯
G¤k1¡°¤ = 1 ¡ °: (A.48)
Since ½s · ½¤; from (A.44) and (A.48) we get
Gsk¡°s
µ
+
1 + ¯
¯
Gsk1¡°s >
G¤k¡°¤
µ
+
1 + ¯
¯
G¤k1¡°¤ : (A.49)
7We are left with a second degree equation in ½, from where we pick the positive
solution, given the assumption that ½ > 0.
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From (A.47) and (A.49), and since from the human capital accumulation
function Gk
¡°
µ = N , it follows
Ns > N¤: (A.50)
Now, given that ½s · ½¤, from (A.46) and (A.47) we have
Ns · N¤; (A.51)
which contradicts (A.50).
² Proof of Proposition 9
Suppose the proposition is false, that is, ½s > ½
¤ and bi = 0 for all i.
Then (A.44) becomes
Gsk¡°s
µ
+
1 + ¯
¯
Gsk1¡°s = 1 ¡ °: (A.52)
From (A.45) and the de…nition of k¤, we have that
Gsk1¡°s > G
¤k1¡°¤ : (A.53)
From (A.48), (A.52) and (A.53) we obtain, since Gk
¡°
µ = N ,
Ns < N¤: (A.54)
Now, from (A.46) and given that ½s > ½
¤,
1 + Gsk1¡°s
Ns
<
1 + G¤k1¡°¤
N¤
: (A.55)
From (A.53) and (A.55) we have
Ns > N¤;
which contradicts (A.54).
² Derivation of the steady-state growth rates when bt+1 = 0
In the case of inoperative bequests, bt+1 = 0 and (18) holds with strict
inequality. Combining (2), (3) and (16), we get
Ct =
wat ht ¡ ptht+1
1 + ¯
: (A.56)
Substituting (A.56) into (2) for Ct gives
st =
(wat ht ¡ ptht+1)¯
1 + ¯
: (A.57)
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Substituting (15) and (A.24) into (A.57) for wat and st respectively, and
since °1 = °2 = ° yields, after some manipulations,
°
1 ¡ °
GWC
1 + rt+1
=
1 ¡ NW1¡°
1 + 1¯
: (A.58)
From (38) and (16), noting that
Ctt+1
Ct¡1t
= GWC , substituting for st from (A.24),
and using ptht+1 = wthtN t1¡°2 , °1 = °2 = °, wt = wt = w for all t, Nt = 1 ¡N t
and dividing by ht,
°
1 ¡ °
GWC
1 + rt+1
=
1
(1 ¡ °)2
Ã
N
W
½ (1 ¡ °) ¡ (1 ¡ °)
!
: (A.59)
Solving (A.58) and (A.59) for GWC and N
W , using (5) and noting that k = k,
yields
GWC = (½µ)
1¡° (1 ¡ °)2¡° f¯ [1 ¡ ½ (1 ¡ °)]g
° f1 + ¯ + ¯ (1 ¡ °)g1¡°
1 + ¯ + ½¯ (1 ¡ °)2 ;
(A.60)
N
W
=
½ (1 ¡ °)2 [1 + ¯ + ¯ (1 ¡ °)]
1 + ¯ + ½¯ (1 ¡ °)2 : (A.61)
The same reasoning for the case of the fully unionized economy would give
us
GUC = (½µ)
1¡° (1 ¡ °)3(1¡°)
n
¯
h
1 ¡ ½ (1 ¡ °)2
io° f1 + 2¯g1¡°
1 + ¯ + ½¯ (1 ¡ °)2 ; (A.62)
N
U
=
½ (1 ¡ °)3 (1 + 2¯)
1 + ¯ + ½¯ (1 ¡ °)2 : (A.63)
² Proof of Proposition 10
Comparing (A.60) and (A.62) we obtain that (½; °1; °2) 2 ©1 if³
1+2¯¡°¯
1+2¯
´1¡° h 1¡½(1¡°)
1¡½(1¡°)2
i° ¡ (1 ¡ °)1¡2° > 0. Equivalently, (½; °1; °2) 2 ©2
if the above inequality does not hold.
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